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HOW DO START-UPS OBTAIN THEIR LEGAL SERVICES?
DARIAN M. IBRAHIM*
This Essay is the first to examine, using responses to online surveys,
the use of in-house versus outside counsel by rapid-growth start-up
companies. It also explores, from the vantage point of the start-up’s
entrepreneur, some reasons for that choice. The Essay tests several
hypotheses derived from the economic and entrepreneurship literatures
about the benefits of in-house versus outside counsel in the unique context
of start-up firms.
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INTRODUCTION
The growing importance of in-house counsel has been the focus of
academic study.1 Yet most of that work focuses on in-house counsel at
large corporations, and for understandable reasons: large corporations
are where in-house counsel are most likely to be found. But the
question remains whether in-house counsel are also gaining traction at
start-up companies. This Essay is the first to examine, using responses
to online surveys, whether start-ups also use in-house counsel. It also
explores, from the vantage point of the start-up’s entrepreneur, some
reasons for that choice. The Essay is limited in its scope of data
collection and thus the conclusions that can be drawn; however, the
survey responses allow me to test several hypotheses derived from the

1.

See infra note 4 and accompanying text.
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economic and entrepreneurship literatures about the benefits of in-house
versus outside counsel in the unique context of start-up firms.
The most salient results of my study are as follows. First, as
expected, most entrepreneurs who responded to the online survey did
not employ full-time in-house counsel. For those start-ups, the most
common reason given was that an in-house attorney was not costjustified at this stage in the company’s development. The second most
common reason was that outside counsel offer more coverage than inhouse counsel. All other reasons for favoring outside counsel lagged
behind these two reasons by a substantial margin.2
For the smaller number of entrepreneurs who did employ full-time
in-house counsel, the top explanation was in-house counsel’s perceived
advantage over outside counsel in understanding the company’s
business. In economics parlance, in-house counsel were seen as having
lower information asymmetries about the start-up’s business than
outside counsel. Other reasons given for hiring in-house counsel
included their superior ability to monitor the inner workings of the
company and their greater responsiveness to company demands.
Through its original empirical evidence, this Essay contributes to
the economic literature on information asymmetries and agency costs,
the burgeoning literature on law and entrepreneurship,3 and the
literature on the growing importance of in-house counsel generally. On
the latter, this Essay is most similar to Steven Schwarcz’s terrific
empirical paper on value creation by in-house counsel at large
corporations.4
Although this Essay is the first academic work exploring in-house
counsel in the start-up context, it is admittedly only a limited start.
Considering the timeline for completing the Essay,5 online surveys
were chosen as a means of soliciting data over face-to-face interviews
or phone calls, which could have led to more participation and deeper
questioning. To encourage busy entrepreneurs to respond to online
surveys, I promised complete anonymity and confidentiality to
respondents. However, these promises prevented me from knowing
which entrepreneurs responded to the survey and which did not. The
complete anonymity also prevented me from matching entrepreneurs to
2.
survey.
3.

See infra Part III for a summary of the main empirical results of the

See Darian M. Ibrahim & D. Gordon Smith, Entrepreneurs on Horseback:
Reflections on the Organization of Law, 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 71, 82–83 n.65 (2008)

(citing examples of academic work that fit within the “law and entrepreneurship”
genre).
4.
Steven L. Schwarcz, To Make or to Buy: In-House Lawyering and Value
Creation, 33 J. CORP. L. 497 (2008).
5.
This Essay is part of the 2011 Wisconsin Law Review Symposium.
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responses, which meant I could not dig deeper into those companies’
characteristics (e.g., age, industry, and revenue) to draw more nuanced
conclusions about the types of start-ups using in-house counsel. Also,
while a more minor point, for simplicity this Essay frames the choice
between in-house and outside counsel as a binary choice (i.e., the startup is presented as having only one or the other, when in reality even a
start-up with in-house counsel may need outside counsel for some legal
issues).6
With these caveats in mind, this Essay proceeds as follows. Part I
sets forth some theory about in-house counsel as well as several
hypotheses about an entrepreneur’s choice between in-house and
outside counsel. Part II discusses the collection of original survey data
to test these hypotheses, including my methodology and its potential
weaknesses. Part III presents the empirical results matched to the
earlier hypotheses. Part IV discusses two attendant issues that were not
the main focus of this Essay, but are nonetheless interesting and present
opportunities for further study. Part V is an appendix presenting the
original survey and raw data.
I. THEORY AND HYPOTHESES
Start-up companies are unique firms. As Joseph Bankman and Ron
Gilson describe it, “[i]n Silicon Valley, the defining myth takes as its
stage David Packard’s or Steve Jobs’ garage. . .. [W]ith nothing but an
idea and strength of character, [the entrepreneur] leaves his job with an
established company, starts a firm that becomes an industry leader, and
in the process becomes fabulously wealthy.”7 Start-ups start small but,
should all go as planned, grow large. Their financing comes from
increasingly sophisticated and well-funded sources—friends and family,
then angel investors, venture capitalists, and finally the public should
the start-up make an initial public offering.8
Companies, including start-ups, obtain their legal services in a
variety of ways. Small firms such as a local restaurant may use local
attorneys and family friends, while large corporations hire the largest,
most prestigious law firms in the world. But large corporations have
6.
The data suggest that in-house counsel at start-ups are primarily used for
transactional and regulatory work, while less so for litigation. This finding is consistent
with prior academic work on the type of work performed by in-house counsel at large
corporations. See Schwarcz, supra note 4, at 498.
7.
Joseph Bankman & Ronald J. Gilson, Why Start-Ups?, 51 STAN. L. REV.
289, 289–90 (1999).
8.
See Darian M. Ibrahim, Should Angel-Backed Start-ups Reject Venture
Capital? 101 (Univ. of Wis. Legal Studies, Research Paper No. 1170, 2011), available
at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1919139.
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also increasingly internalized their legal services by employing one or
sometimes even a small army of in-house counsel.9 In-house counsel
are perceived as having several advantages for large firms; further, the
in-house attorney can play many roles inside a corporation.10
Many of these large corporations with an army of in-house counsel
were once start-ups themselves. At some point in their development
they decided to obtain at least some of their legal services from inhouse counsel as opposed to outside law firms. When did that occur?
And why? This Essay proposes some hypotheses for the use, or nonuse, of in-house counsel at start-up companies that have received at
least $5 million of venture capital financing (typically one round).11
What follows are hypotheses, derived from the economic and
entrepreneurship literatures, about the use of in-house counsel at startups.

A. General Hypothesis: Most Start-ups Will Not Have In-house
Counsel
My general hypothesis is that most start-ups, even those that have
received venture capital financing, will not have full-time in-house
counsel. For purposes of my survey, participants were told that inhouse counsel did not include an employee with law training who might
answer legal questions on an informal basis. The next set of hypotheses
more specifically delve into reasons for the general hypothesis.

B. Hypotheses for Start-ups without In-house Counsel
1. HYPOTHESIS 2.1: IN-HOUSE COUNSEL ARE NOT COST-JUSTIFIED
Start-ups are notoriously cash-strapped. Expenses are heavily
scrutinized and a start-up’s main goal is to use its limited funds to
9.
See, e.g., Robert Eli Rosen, The Inside Counsel Movement, Professional
Judgment and Organizational Reputation, 64 IND. L.J. 479, 481 (1989) (“Corporate

leaders report their greater reliance on corporate legal departments and praise the
departments’ improving quality.”); Schwarcz, supra note 4, at 498 (“There has been a
substantial shift towards more in-house lawyer transactional work in the past decade
. . ..”).
10.
See generally Deborah A. DeMott, The Discrete Roles of General
Counsel, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 955 (2005).
11.
See Darian M. Ibrahim, Financing the Next Silicon Valley, 87 WASH. U.
L. REV. 717, 734 (2010) (typical round of venture capital financing “has spiked from
$2 million to upwards of $5 million”). Venture capitalists stage their financing and
provide several rounds should the start-up progress according to certain benchmarks
and milestones. See Ronald J. Gilson, Engineering a Venture Capital Market: Lessons
from the American Experience, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1067, 1078–81 (2003).
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develop or grow its product or service. As a result, legal and other
needs may be seen as a luxury a start-up cannot afford. For example, in
their important study of patenting among start-ups, Stuart Graham, Rob
Merges, Pam Samuelson, and Ted Sichelman found that “the cost of
getting a patent is the most common reason cited for not patenting a
major technology.”12 Similarly, some start-ups look to exchange stock
for legal services to reduce cash outlays.13
Once start-ups are able to obtain venture capital, they have more
funds at their disposal. Still, venture capitalists do not wish to have
their money used in imprudent manners and employ various
mechanisms to reduce the agency costs that may arise after funding.14
Venture capitalists want their funds dedicated to immediately growing
the company and may feel that full-time in-house counsel are not
warranted. For these reasons, Hypotheses 2.1 predicts that most
entrepreneurs who do not hire in-house counsel will cite cost as an
important consideration.
2. HYPOTHESIS 2.2: OUTSIDE ATTORNEYS OFFER MORE COVERAGE
Outside law firms have multiple attorneys, each with their own
areas of expertise and specialization.15 Hiring a full-service law firm
allows a client to tap into that varied expertise and cover more of its
legal needs. In addition, corporate law firms bring to bear their past
experience working with companies who have progressed through the
life cycles the start-up will encounter.
12.
Stuart J.H. Graham et al., High Technology Entrepreneurs and the Patent
System: Results of the 2008 Berkeley Patent Survey, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1255,
1310 (2009).
13.
See Casey W. Baker, Incubating Golden Eggs: Why Attorney Ethics
Rules May Stifle Small Business Development, 2 ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS. L.J. 507, 521
(2007) (“More and more, attorneys and law firms are exchanging their services for
equity positions in their business clients instead of cash.”); Gwyneth E. McAlpine,

Getting a Piece of the Action: Should Lawyers Be Allowed to Invest in Their Clients’
Stock?, 47 UCLA L. REV. 549, 557 (1999) (“Many start-up companies cannot afford to

pay high legal fees because they do not yet have a product with which to generate
revenue. Instead of cash, they can offer their lawyers equity.”).
14.
See Darian M. Ibrahim, Debt as Venture Capital, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV.
1169, 1206 (“[I]f [venture capitalists] can employ venture debt to force interest
payments, lessen burn rates, and reduce financial slack on the margins, it helps them
monitor entrepreneurs and reduces agency costs.”).
15.
See Marc Galanter & William Henderson, The Elastic Tournament: A
Second Transformation of the Big Law Firm, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1867, 1868–69 (2008)
(“[As of 2000] large law firm lawyers comprised 10.5% of the U.S. legal
profession.”); cf. Larry E. Ribstein, The Death of Big Law, 2010 WIS. L. REV. 749
(arguing that big law firms are a fundamentally flawed business model and predicting
dire consequences for firms that fail to adapt to the changing corporate landscape).
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This wide array of experience that outside counsel can offer a
start-up is attractive to an entrepreneur. The needs of a growing
company change quickly, and a start-up might require diverse services
that only a large law firm can provide. Further, entrepreneurs might
lack not only legal but also business experience, and value input from
experienced corporate lawyers who have helped other start-ups grow.
For these reasons, Hypothesis 2.2 predicts that entrepreneurs who
prefer outside law firms will point to their perceived expertise and
breadth of coverage as important considerations.
3. HYPOTHESIS 2.3: OUTSIDE ATTORNEYS ARE MORE INDEPENDENT/
OBJECTIVE

Because outside law firms have multiple clients, their billings
and livelihoods are less dependent on pleasing any one particular client.
Conversely, in-house counsel have all their eggs in one basket, and
therefore are at greater risk of telling management what they think they
want to hear.16 Entrepreneurs might prefer to hear both positive and
negative aspects about their business and legal challenges from a neutral
source in order to remain competitive. Thus, Hypothesis 2.3 predicts
that entrepreneurs who rely on outside counsel could believe that these
attorneys are more independent and objective.
4. HYPOTHESIS 2.4: OUTSIDE ATTORNEYS WILL ENHANCE OUR
REPUTATION

In his classic work on value creation by business lawyers, Ron
Gilson notes that business lawyers “commonly play the role of
reputational intermediary,”17 renting their established reputations to
clients who are less established. Karl Okamoto follows Gilson’s work
with an empirical test of the reputation-intermediary theory, breaking
business lawyers into two categories: in-house and outside counsel.18
Like Gilson, Okamoto observes that “clients who are unable to
effectively bond their own performance resort to high reputation
intermediaries to rent the intermediary’s reputation as a bond.”19
Okamoto then theorizes that, unlike other business lawyers, in-house
16.
See John S. Dzienkowski & Robert J. Peroni, The Decline in Lawyer
Independence: Lawyer Equity Investments in Clients, 81 TEX. L. REV. 405, 517 (2002)
(“The danger of impaired judgment of the in-house counsel may exist.”).
17.
Ronald J. Gilson, Value Creation by Business Lawyers: Legal Skills and
Asset Pricing, 94 YALE L.J. 239, 290 (1984).
18.
Karl S. Okamoto, Reputation and the Value of Lawyers, 74 OR. L. REV.
15 (1995).
19.
Id. at 26.
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counsel are not a good reputational intermediary because they have only
one client, and thus “third parties will rationally discount [their]
independence due to the risk of capture.”20 Conversely, because outside
counsel have multiple clients, they can play the role of reputational
intermediary. Using a data set of corporations filing for public offerings
of securities, Okamoto finds empirical support for these assertions.21
Start-up companies have sparse track records, and are thus in
greater need of reputational intermediaries than the corporations
Okamoto studied. Because the reputation of outside law firms is
enhanced by their success with past clients and ability to attract top
legal talent, Hypothesis 2.4 predicts that entrepreneurs who prefer
outside counsel will perceive these attorneys as able to enhance their
standing in the business community.
5. HYPOTHESIS 2.5: OUTSIDE ATTORNEYS CAN CONNECT US TO ANGELS
AND VENTURE CAPITALISTS

While the prior hypothesis is that outside counsel can enhance a
start-up’s reputation with any third party, one third party of particular
importance to start-ups is the outside investor. Angel investors and
venture capitalists are vital to the life of a start-up,22 and entrepreneurs
spend considerable time trying to find and sell these investors on their
companies.
In his important work on Silicon Valley law firms, Mark Suchman
suggests that in addition to their traditional functions, outside counsel
play “matchmaker” between start-ups and venture capitalists.23 In other
words, outside counsel, as repeat players in the entrepreneurial finance
game, “channel[] start-ups to ‘appropriate’ venture capital funds.”24
Consequently, Hypothesis 2.5 is that entrepreneurs who prefer outside
counsel will do so in part because these attorneys can connect them to
investors.

20.
Id. at 28.
21.
Id. at 38 (“The principal finding from the data is the existence of
segmentation in the market for legal services based on the value of reputation. [Clients]
who have relied on the technical competence of their corporate counsel in contexts
where verification and reputational bonding are not needed turn to outside counsel when
they are.”).
22.
See Ibrahim, supra note 8, at 103–04.
23.
Mark C. Suchman, Dealmakers and Counselors: Law Firms as
Intermediaries in the Development of Silicon Valley, in UNDERSTANDING SILICON
VALLEY: THE ANATOMY OF AN ENTREPRENEURIAL REGION 71, 89 (Martin Kenney ed.,
2000).
24.
Id.
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B. Hypotheses for Start-ups with In-house Counsel
The preceding hypotheses all provide reasons that entrepreneurs
may eschew in-house counsel at the start-up stage. However, there are
good reasons why entrepreneurs may hire in-house counsel even before
becoming large corporations. Those reasons form the hypotheses that
follow.
1. HYPOTHESIS 3.1: IN-HOUSE COUNSEL WILL BETTER UNDERSTAND
OUR BUSINESS

In his empirical paper on in-house counsel at large corporations,
Schwarcz predicts that outside counsel will have steeper learning curves
than in-house counsel when it comes to understanding the company’s
business.25 In economic terms, in-house counsel have lower information
asymmetries when it comes to understanding their clients’ businesses
and thus more effectively serve their legal needs.26 Although the outside
attorneys Schwarcz surveyed did not believe this was a significant
issue,27 their answers could be somewhat self-serving.
Due to their high-tech nature, start-ups may present even greater
information asymmetries to outside counsel. These unique companies
are often working in cutting-edge fields such as software,
biotechnology, and clean energy. These fields require lawyers that
know the intricate regulatory and competitive landscapes that are
unique to each field. Having a competent lawyer who focuses solely on
that start-up may prove to be a competitive advantage. For these
reasons, Hypothesis 3.1 predicts that entrepreneurs who hire in-house
counsel will perceive these attorneys as better positioned to understand
their business.
2. HYPOTHESIS 3.2: IN-HOUSE COUNSEL WILL BE MORE
RESPONSIVE/TIMELY
Schwarcz also predicts that in-house counsel “are generally more
responsive to and can better communicate with the ‘client’ than outside
counsel.”28 This may be because of the “physical proximity,” with inhouse counsel and company management “having offices in the same
building if not on the same floor.”29 It may also be because
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

Schwarcz, supra note 4, at 503–04.

Id. at 525.
Id. at 552.
Id. at 509.
Id.
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management feels more comfortable communicating with in-house
counsel due to their repeat interactions. Therefore, Hypothesis 3.2
predicts that entrepreneurs who hire in-house counsel will perceive
those attorneys as being more responsive/timely than outside counsel.
3. HYPOTHESIS 3.3: IN-HOUSE COUNSEL CAN BETTER MONITOR THE
INNER WORKINGS OF OUR COMPANY

Economic theory would suggest that full-time employees of a
company are better able to monitor the company’s inner workings than
an outsider hired on an intermittent basis. And greater monitoring can
reduce agency costs. Translating these general theories to the choice
between in-house and outside counsel, Schwarcz notes that there are
two kinds of agency costs that in-house counsel can potentially
mitigate—the first is misbehavior by company managers, while the
second is conflicts with outside counsel.30 Because start-ups may not
have significant need for outside counsel if in-house counsel are
employed, the most relevant agency cost for my purposes is
misbehavior by company managers.
As Schwarcz observes, “[i]n-house counsel’s informal day-to-day
interactions with other corporate employees give them access to
information through back channels that would rarely, if ever, be
available to outside counsel.”31 As a result, in-house counsel may be
able to identify and head-off legal and other problems at an earlier stage
than outside counsel. For these reasons, Hypothesis 3.3 predicts that
entrepreneurs who hire in-house counsel will consider it important that
these attorneys are better able to monitor the inner workings of the
company than outside counsel.
II. METHODOLOGY

A. Data Gathering
To test the hypotheses set forth in Part I, original data were
gathered through online surveys. The first step was to determine a
sample population. I chose venture capital-backed start-ups because
they are important drivers of economic growth and job creation in the
U.S. economy.32 Further, their use of in-house counsel has been
30.
Id. at 505.
31.
Id.
32.
See Press Release, Nat’l Venture Capital Ass’n, National Venture Capital
Association Releases Recommendations to Restore Liquidity in the U.S. Venture
Capital Industry (Apr. 29, 2009), available at http://www.dcm.com/dnld/news/
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unexplored in the academic literature. The VentureXpert database
provided by Thomson Financial was used to identify these companies.
To limit the sample size, I included only companies formed between
2006 and 2008 that received at least $5 million in venture capital
funding since their formation. After reviewing the list, I noticed a
number of venture capital firms themselves were included in the
sample. Because operating firms and not their financiers were the target
population, I removed all venture capital firms from the sample. This
led to an original total of 1,678 start-ups to attempt to survey.
The next step was to distribute online surveys to these start-ups.
The website SurveyMonkey (www.surveymonkey.com) was selected to
distribute the surveys and collect the data.33 SurveyMonkey enables
easy preparation and distribution of surveys, allows survey participants
to quickly submit information, and offers tools to neatly analyze and
report data. As mentioned earlier, online surveying, and
SurveyMonkey in particular, was chosen as a means of collecting data
for reasons of time and expediency. The survey was kept short, with an
estimated response time of approximately 5-10 minutes, to maximize
the breadth of participation even though this sacrificed depth.
The survey was e-mailed to the chief executive officer or someone
in a similar position at each start-up. In short, a high-ranking officer
was selected as the crude approximation of the start-up’s
“entrepreneur.” The e-mail addresses that we received for each start-up
from VentureXpert varied. For some, the CEO’s name and e-mail
address were listed, in which case the CEO received the survey. In
many cases the CEO was not listed, however, and the next highestranking titled officer (e.g., CFO, COO) was chosen, followed by a
board member if no officers were listed. If no one from the board of
directors was listed, the survey went to the highest-ranking employee
listed (e.g., a vice president).
The surveys were originally distributed on June 13, 2011. Three
reminder e-mails were sent over the following month in an attempt to
obtain more responses. Several e-mails bounced back, which is to be
expected as many start-ups fail or are acquired by larger companies.
We ultimately received seventy one responses out of 1,460 surveys sent
(excluding bounced e-mails), resulting in a response rate of 4.86%. The

NVCARecommendations042909.pdf (“[I]n 2008 public companies that were once
venture-backed accounted for more than 12 million U.S. jobs and $2.9 trillion in
revenues, which equates to 21 percent of U.S. GDP.”).
33.
Web-based surveys are now commonly used for data collection. See, e.g.,
D. Daniel Sokol, Antitrust, Institutions, and Merger Control, 17 GEO. MASON L. REV.
1055, 1120 (2010) (“The data for this study comes from an online survey, which was
launched at www.surveymonkey.com.”).
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response rate seems to be low compared to other surveys of this type.34
Online surveys often wind up in recipients’ spam folders and may not
be treated that seriously, especially if distributed through a commonly
available site such as SurveyMonkey. The recipients were too
numerous to follow up with phone calls or attempts for face-to-face
interviews, as others have done to encourage participation.35 It is also
important to keep in mind that these are CEOs or the like at highpressured start-ups, not the type of people likely to have free time for
survey requests.

B. Selection Issues
There were several issues with the survey methodology that could
have introduced selection bias to the results. As a general matter,
“[s]urvey methodology is potentially subject to flaws. . .. [and is]
dependent on the precise wording, format, and context of the survey
questions.”36 Further, survey responses come only from those who
voluntarily respond to the survey request. There could be systematic
differences between start-ups whose entrepreneurs responded to my
survey and those whose entrepreneurs did not. The surveys were only
sent to entrepreneurs, while many questions would have been better
answered by lawyers. Interviewing only entrepreneurs also raised the
possibility of biased responses where indicators of creativity and
innovation were concerned. Finally, entrepreneurs may have refrained
from providing information that they felt would reflect negatively on
themselves, their start-up, or the industry they work in. Thus, there is a
possibility that they provided responses they believed were socially
desirable, even if less accurate.
Although VentureXpert is my preferred database for collecting
information about venture capital-backed start-ups, there are other

34.
Graham et al., supra note 12, at 1272 (conducting large-scale patent
survey with response rates of 10.6% from Dun & Bradstreet database and 17.9% from
VentureXpert database); Lawrence P. McLellan, Expanding the Use of Collaborative

Law: Consideration of Its Use in a Legal Aid Program for Resolving Family Law
Disputes, 2008 J. DISP. RESOL. 465, 474 (noting response rate of 7.5% using
SurveyMonkey); Tse-Hua Shih & Xitao Fan, Comparing Response Rates from Web
and Mail Surveys: A Meta-Analysis, 20 FIELD METHODS 249, 257 (2008) (finding the
mean response rate for web-based surveys is 34%); Sokol, supra note 32, at 1120

(noting response rate of 19% using SurveyMonkey).
35.
Brian Broughman & Jesse Fried, Renegotiation of Cash Flow Rights in
the Sale of VC-Backed Firms, 95 J. FIN. ECON. 384, 387–88 (2010), available at http://
ssrn.com/abstract=956243 (detailing the authors’ multi-pronged approach to obtain
responses that led to a roughly 40% response rate).
36.
Schwarcz, supra note 4, at 502.
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databases that might offer different advantages.37 Keeping answers
anonymous made it impossible to match entrepreneurs and responses;
this prevented me from going back into VentureXpert and matching
responses with specific firm types. It could be that in-house counsel
usage is a function of age, revenue vs. pre-revenue, or industry. Yet I
was unable to answer these questions in this limited survey. Finally,
choosing only start-ups formed between 2006 and 2008 with at least
five million dollars in venture capital funding was somewhat arbitrary.
The choice to survey these companies and not others might affect the
results because start-ups thrive or fail more prevalently with cyclical
macroeconomic conditions.
III. EMPIRICAL RESULTS
Keeping in mind the low response rate and selection effects
discussed in the previous Part, the Essay will now highlight the main
empirical results of my survey. It will also analyze those results against
the hypotheses set forth in Part I.

A. General Hypothesis: Most Start-ups Will Not Have In-house
Counsel: Comparison with Empirical Results
The data were consistent with the hypothesis that most
entrepreneurs will not hire full-time in-house counsel. Almost 72% of
respondents did not have in-house counsel, while only 28% did. Even
entrepreneurs who reported having in-house counsel used them
primarily for transactional and regulatory work. Over 63% of
respondents estimated that the primary focus of their in-house attorney
was transactional work,38 over 31% said regulatory matters,39 and only
6% litigation.40 Likewise, the in-house counsel in Schwarcz’s study did

37.
See Graham et al., supra note 12, at 1269–71 (combining databases from
VentureXpert and Dun & Bradstreet for the authors’ patent survey of 15,000 firms).
38.
Transactional work was defined by the survey to include “contracts,
employment agreements, and corporate governance matters such as fund-raising
documents and stock option plans.” See infra Part V.
39.
Regulatory matters were defined by the survey to include “regulatory
compliance, and working with governmental bodies including the Patent and Trademark
Office (PTO), Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), [and] Food and Drug
Administration (FDA).” See infra Part V.
40.
Litigation was defined by the survey to include “mediation, arbitration,
and courtroom representation.” See infra Part V.
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“not address such non-transactional lawyering roles as litigation,
lobbying, or compliance work.”41
For purposes of my survey, participants were told that in-house
counsel did not include an employee with law training who might
answer legal questions on an informal basis. It should be noted that
28.3% of respondents without in-house counsel gave as one reason for
that choice that they “have an employee with legal training that plays
the role of in-house attorney when needed.” Only one respondent, or
2.2% of the sample, listed that as their most important reason for
eschewing in-house counsel.

B. Hypotheses for Start-ups without In-house Counsel: Comparison
with Empirical Results
Start-ups without in-house counsel were asked to answer a series
of questions to probe their decision to rely solely on outside counsel.
The results are reported below.
1. HYPOTHESIS 2.1: IN-HOUSE COUNSEL ARE NOT COST-JUSTIFIED
When asked to indicate all of their reasons for not having in-house
counsel from a series of choices, almost 83% of entrepreneurs
responded that it was not cost-justified, making it the most common
reason given by far. In the next question, entrepreneurs were asked to
rank their reasons for not having in-house counsel. Again, “not costjustified” topped the list, garnering over 61% of the total first-place
votes. Therefore, the perceived cost of compensating in-house counsel
appears to be a significant factor to entrepreneurs who eschew them.
Hypothesis 2.1, that in-house counsel are not cost-justified, is
consistent with the data.
Interestingly, entrepreneurs who eschewed in-house counsel were
also polled on the extent of their legal needs. Over 82% claimed their
start-up has “significant legal needs.” Further, when asked how much
they spent on legal services in 2010, more than 67% claimed that it was
41.
Schwarcz, supra note 4, at 499. My results suggest in-house counsel in
start-ups might focus more on “compliance” work than the in-house counsel in
Schwarcz’s study. Over 30% of my respondents listed regulatory matters as the
primary focus for their in-house counsel. It is important to note that my results could
differ from Schwarcz’s if a large percentage of my sample were biotechnology or clean
technology companies with significant regulatory issues. In addition, my results might
reflect the greater tendency of start-ups to file for patent protection as opposed to nonhigh-tech companies. See Graham et al., supra note 12, at 1302 (comparing the average
number of patents/applications held by start-ups across several industries).
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over $70,000. While salaries for in-house counsel can vary
significantly, in today’s economy at a young start-up, it would seem
that $70,000 could make an attractive salary, especially if combined
with stock options.42 However, to offer the experience and coverage a
start-up might need would require a more seasoned attorney, who
would likely charge well over $70,000 as a base salary, especially in
Silicon Valley.
2. HYPOTHESIS 2.2: OUTSIDE ATTORNEYS OFFER MORE COVERAGE
When asked to check all of the reasons for relying on outside
counsel, over 60% of respondents checked that outside counsel offers
more coverage, making it the second most common reason given for
preferring outside counsel. In the next question, when respondents
ranked their reasons for relying on outside counsel, “more coverage”
garnered second place. Over 28% of respondents listed coverage as
their most important reason. Therefore, the data are consistent with the
hypothesis that the perceived depth of specialization and coverage
offered by outside counsel is an important factor to entrepreneurs. The
data support the view that start-ups require diversified legal services
that only a large law firm can provide.
3. HYPOTHESIS 2.3: OUTSIDE COUNSEL ARE MORE
INDEPENDENT/OBJECTIVE.
When asked to check all of their reasons for relying on outside
counsel,
only
13%
of
respondents
included
“more
independent/objective” in their responses. Further, only 4% of
respondents believed that the greater independence/objectivity of
outside counsel was the primary reason to hire outside counsel over inhouse counsel. Therefore, this hypothesis was not supported by the data
and can be rejected.

42.
Interestingly, only 6.3% of start-ups with in-house counsel used stock
options as the primary means of compensating them, and only 12.5% used an
approximately equal combination of stock options and salary. Conversely, 81.3% of
entrepreneurs reported that their in-house counsel’s compensation came primarily in the
form of salary. Unfortunately I did not ask those entrepreneurs whether stock options
were still a component of the attorney’s compensation, even if salary was its primary
component. See DeMott, supra note 10, at 963 (“[A] general counsel’s compensation
package often includes components not otherwise available, such as stock options and
other forms of compensation based on an employer’s equity securities.”); Steven L.
Schwarcz, Explaining the Value of Transactional Lawyering, 12 STAN. J.L. BUS. &
FIN. 486, 502 (2007) (finding that transactional lawyers add value by acting as
reputational intermediaries); Suchman, supra note 23, at 89.
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4. HYPOTHESIS 2.4: OUTSIDE COUNSEL WILL ENHANCE OUR
REPUTATION

When asked to check all of their reasons for relying on outside
counsel, only 8.7% of respondents perceived outside counsel as
enhancing their reputations with third parties. Further, in terms of rank,
only 2% of respondents saw reputational enhancement as the primary
reason to choose outside counsel over in-house counsel. Therefore, the
reputational intermediary hypothesis was not supported by the data. In
his empirical work on in-house counsel at large corporations, Schwarcz
also found little support for the reputational intermediary hypothesis.43
5. HYPOTHESIS 2.5: OUTSIDE COUNSEL CAN CONNECT US TO ANGELS
AND VENTURE CAPITALISTS

When asked to check all of their reasons for relying on outside
counsel, only 4% included among their reasons that outside counsel
could connect them to angel investors and venture capitalists. Further,
no respondents listed this as the primary reason to hire outside counsel.
It should be noted that all of the surveyed firms had attracted at least
one round of venture capital funding, which could make them non-ideal
respondents on this question. Still, based on the results of my survey,
the “matchmaking” hypothesis was not supported by the data and can
be rejected. This calls into question Suchman’s findings on Silicon
Valley law firms as matchmakers to entrepreneurs and venture
capitalists.44 However, there could be a time lag explanation here (i.e.,
lawyers could have served as important matchmakers in the past, but
given technological advances and the like, they have more competition
for that role today).

B. Hypotheses for Start-ups with In-house Counsel: Comparison to
Empirical Results
Even though the survey data indicated that most start-ups do not
have in-house counsel, we also collected data from several start-ups that
did. Start-ups with full-time in-house counsel were asked to answer a
series of questions probing the reasons for that choice.

43.
Steven L. Schwarcz, Explaining the Value of Transactional Lawyering, 12
STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 486, 502 (2007) (finding that transactional lawyers add value
by acting as reputational intermediaries).
44.
See Suchman, supra note 23, at 89.
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1. HYPOTHESIS 3.1: IN-HOUSE COUNSEL WILL BETTER UNDERSTAND
OUR BUSINESS

When asked to check all of their reasons for employing in-house
counsel, 93.8% of respondents included that in-house counsel can better
understand the company’s business and therefore work more efficiently
and cost-effectively. This made it the most common choice by far.
When entrepreneurs were then asked to rank their reasons for hiring inhouse counsel, better understanding the company’s business again
topped the list, garnering over 75% of the “most important” reason
votes.45 Therefore, the data are consistent with the hypothesis that inhouse counsel have lower information asymmetries about a start-up’s
business than outside counsel.
2. HYPOTHESIS 3.2: IN-HOUSE COUNSEL WILL BE MORE
RESPONSIVE/TIMELY
Out of all their reasons for hiring in-house counsel, 56.3% of
respondents included that an in-house attorney would be more timely
and responsive than outside counsel. When asked to rank their reasons
preferring in-house counsel, “more timely/responsive” garnered over
13% of the “most important” reason votes. The data therefore appear
to provide weak support for the hypothesis that entrepreneurs perceive
in-house counsel as more responsive to the start-up’s needs than outside
counsel.
3. HYPOTHESIS 3.3: IN-HOUSE COUNSEL CAN BETTER MONITOR THE
INNER WORKINGS OF OUR COMPANY

When asked to include all of their reasons for hiring in-house
counsel, 68.8% of respondents checked that in-house counsel would be
better able to monitor the inner workings of the start-up than outside
counsel. When asked to rank their reasons for hiring in-house counsel,
the monitoring explanation garnered 12.5% of the “most important”
reason votes. Therefore, the hypothesis that in-house counsel reduce

45.
Unfortunately, I included two choices to this survey question that were
substantially the same. The first choice read “Because an in-house attorney can better
understand our business and therefore work more efficiently and cost effectively,”
while the second read “Because an in-house attorney better understands our business
than an outside attorney.” See infra Part V. For purposes of reporting the ranked
results, the “most important” votes given on both of these questions were combined.
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agency costs through superior monitoring was a hypothesis that had
moderate support in the data.
IV. ATTENDANT ISSUES FOR FURTHER STUDY
The foregoing Part revealed the main results of my study and how
they matched up with the hypotheses presented earlier. The Essay will
now conclude by briefly discussing two attendant issues on which
entrepreneurs were also surveyed that warrant further study.

A. Attorney-Client Privilege and Board Seats
As Schwarcz observes, “[a]lthough in-house counsel are
theoretically afforded the same privilege as outside counsel, the
privilege only applies to communications that constitute ‘legal’ rather
than ‘business’ advice.”46 In-house counsel, especially at nascent startups, may be asked to provide business advice as well as legal advice as
a full-time member of the “team.” The issue of attorney-client privilege
is further complicated if in-house counsel serve on the company’s board
of directors, where business advice is what is called for.47 In-house
counsel, it seems, would be more likely to sit on a start-up’s board than
would outside counsel. Therefore, while it may be low on the list of
considerations for a young company, start-ups may prefer outside
counsel to in-house counsel to preserve attorney-client confidentiality.
My survey asked entrepreneurs with in-house counsel whether they
worried about in-house counsel compromising attorney-client privilege
relative to outside counsel. Almost 94% of respondents said that they
did not have this concern. In addition, the same percentage reported
that their in-house counsel did not serve on the start-up’s board of
directors. It stands to reason that if in-house counsel were more
prevalent on start-up boards, attorney-client privilege could be a greater
concern. But from my data, at least, preserving attorney-client privilege
does not appear to give entrepreneurs a reason to favor outside counsel.

Schwarcz, supra note 4, at 512.
Janet J. Higley et al., Confidentiality of Communications by In-House
Counsel for Financial Institutions, 6 N.C. BANKING INST. 265, 287 (2002) (noting
problems when in-house counsel also serves as a member of the board of directors of
the corporation client); Susanna M. Kim, Dual Identities and Dueling Obligations:
Preserving Independence in Corporate Representation, 68 TENN. L. REV. 179, 182
(2001) (“One of the most controversial issues arising out of the context of corporate
representation involves the corporate lawyer’s relationship vis-a-vis the board of
directors.”).
46.
47.
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B. “Rent-a-General Counsel” Law Firms.
To this point the Essay has presented only two means by which
start-ups may obtain their legal services: in-house counsel or traditional
outside law firms. But a third hybrid option is sprouting up as well.
This option is a hybrid situated between the in-house counsel and
traditional outside counsel. It is an outside law firm, but composed
mostly of former in-house counsel. Sometimes referred to as “rent-ageneral counsel” or “legal outsourcing,”48 these innovative firms are as
entrepreneurial as the start-ups they serve.
Rent-a-GC firms recognize that start-ups (and other companies)
may have legal needs that are too few to justify full-time in-house
counsel, but also do not justify a traditional law firm’s steep hourly
rates and learning curve. Rent-a-GC firms charge less than large law
firms49 and are quicker to hit the ground running due to their attorneys’
prior in-house experience. Leading this entrepreneurial charge are firms
such as Outside GC of Boston, The General Counsel, LLC of Southern
California, and The General Counsel, Ltd. of Minneapolis, among
others.50
In order to investigate the rise of Rent-a-GC firms further, the
survey asked all entrepreneurs whether they had ever used this type of
firm. Over 87% of respondents reported that they had not. Of the
almost 13% of respondents that had used such a firm, over half were
“satisfied” with the firm’s performance, and another third were
“somewhat” satisfied. Over 11% reported that they were “not
satisfied” with their experience. Because so few respondents had used
such a firm, these percentages are highly driven by a few responses and
should be discounted accordingly. Further study should be done in this

48.
This type of legal outsourcing is not to be confused with the legal
outsourcing to other countries that Larry Ribstein discusses in his recent article on the
decline of large law firms. Ribstein, supra note 15, at 766–67.
49.
See Terry Carter, Outsiders Inside, 96 A.B.A. J., Feb. 2010, at 31
(discussing that fees for rent-a-GC firms “typically run about a third of the going rate”
of traditional law firms); Tonyia Sullivan, Small Businesses Save Money by Hiring
Outsourced Counsel, AUSTIN BUS J. (Feb. 12, 2006, 11:00 PM), http://
www.bizjournals.com/Austin/stories/2006/02/13/focus3.html (noting that one Austinbased outsourcing firm “provides legal services to clients at 30 percent to 40 percent
less than what it would cost to employ a full-time general counsel”); Chad Eric Watt,
General Counsel, Anyone? Outsourcing Is an Option, ORLANDO BUS. J. (May 13,
2002, 12:00 AM), http://www.bizjournals.com/orlando/stories/2002/05/13/focus1.html
(“General Counsel Advisors typically charges 50-75 percent less than big law firms
. . ..”).
50.
See John Wallbillich, Rent-A-GC, WIREDGC (Dec. 12, 2005), http://
www.wiredgc.com/205/12/12/rent-a-gc.
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area, as Rent-a-GC firms could present a promising middle ground by
which start-ups obtain their legal services.

How Start-ups Obtain Legal Services

2012:333

353

V. APPENDIX: SURVEY QUESTION AND ANSWERS
Introductory Question
Do you have an “in-house attorney,” meaning an attorney who works full
time at your company? (NOTE: If you have an employee with law training that
answers legal questions on an informal basis, but you do NOT have a formally
designated in-house attorney, please answer “No.”)
Answer Options

Response

Response Count

Percent
Yes

28.2%

20

No

71.8%

51

Questions for Companies With In-house Attorneys:
Question #1: For the following question, please select the answer that
best describes the primary focus of your in-house attorney.
Answer Options

Response

Response Count

Percent
Transactional

work

(e.g.,

contracts,

employment

62.5%

10

6.3%

1

31.3%

5

agreements, and corporate governance matters such as
fund-raising documents and stock option plans)
Litigation

(including

mediation,

arbitration,

and

courtroom representation)
Regulatory matters (e.g., regulatory compliance, and
working with governmental bodies including the Patent
and Trademark Office (PTO), Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC), Food & Drug Administration
(FDA))

Question # 2: Why did you hire an in-house attorney instead of relying on
outside law firms? Choose all options that apply.
Answer Options

Response

Response Count

Percent
Because it’s generally cheaper to pay an in-house

50.0%

8

18.8%

3

93.8%

15

attorney greater than outside firms, which charge too
much
Because it’s cheaper to compensate an in-house attorney,
as they can be paid with stock options
Because an in-house attorney can better understand my
business and therefore work more efficiently and cost-
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effectively
Because outside attorneys are not transparent in the fees

0.0%

0

62.5%

10

31.3%

5

56.3%

9

68.8%

11

they charge
Because an in-house attorney understands my business
better than an outside attorney
Because an in-house attorney would only have my
company as a client and therefore be a stronger advocate
for us
Because an in-house attorney would be more responsive
and timely
Because an in-house attorney would better be able to
monitor the inner workings of my company

Answered Question: 16
Question # 3: Rank the reasons why you hired an in-house attorney by
order of importance. However, ONLY rank the answers that you had checked
in Question 2 above.
Answered Question: 15
Answer Options

1

Most

2

3

4

5

6

7

Important

Because
it’s
generally
cheaper to pay an in-house
attorney
than
outside
counsel, which charge too
much
Because it’s cheaper to
compensate an in-house
attorney, as they can be
paid with stock options
Because
an
in-house
attorney
can
better
understand my business and
therefore
work
more
efficiently
and
costeffectively
Because outside attorneys
are not transparent in the
fees they charge
Because
an
in-house
attorney understands my
business better than an
outside attorney
Because
an
in-house
attorney would only have
my company as a client and
therefore be a stronger
advocate
Because
an
in-house
attorney would be more
responsive and timely

8

Least

Important

13%

13%

13%

7%

7%

0

0

7%

13%

7%

0

7%

0

0

7%

7%

53%

27%

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

7%

0

7

13

0

%

%

40%

27%

7%

7%

0

0

0

0

0

0

20%

0

7%

0

7%

7%

20%

33%

7%

7%

0

0

7%

0
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Because
an
in-house
attorney would better be
able to monitor the inner
workings of my company

20%

27%

33%

0

0

7

355
0

0

%

Question #4: What method of compensation makes up the majority of
your in-house attorney’s salary package?
Answer Options

Response

Response Count

Percent
Salary

81.3%

13

Stock Options

6.3%

1

Approximately 50/50 combination of Salary and Stock

12.5%

2

Options

Question #5: Is your in-house attorney also on the company’s board of
directors?
Answer Options

Response

Response Count

Percent
Yes

6.3%

1

No

93.8%

15

Question #6: Do you worry about an in-house attorney compromising
attorney-client privilege relative to an outside attorney?
Answer Options

Response

Response Count

Percent
Yes

6.3%

1

No

93.8%

15

Questions for Companies Without In-House Counsel
Question #1: Does your company have significant legal needs?
Answer Options

Response

Response Count

Percent
Yes

82.6%

38

No

17.4%

8

Question #2: How much did your company spend on legal services in
2010?
Answer Options

Response

Response Count

Percent
<$10,000

2.2%

1

$10,000-$30,000

8.7%

4

$30,000-$50,000

15.2%

7

$50,000-$70,000

6.5%

3
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>$70,000

67.4%

31

Question #3: What are your legal needs? Check all that apply.
Answer Options

Response

Response Count

Percent
Transactional

work

(e.g.,

contracts,

employment

97.8%

45

and

21.7%

10

Regulatory matters (e.g., regulatory compliance, and

76.1%

35

agreements, and corporate governance matters such as
fund-raising documents and stock option plans)
Litigation

(including

mediation,

arbitration,

courtroom representation)
working with governmental bodies including the Patent
and Trademark Office (PTO), Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC), Food & Drug Administration (FDA))

Question #4: Why have you not hired an in-house attorney? Check all
that apply.
Answer Options

Response

Response Count

Percent
An in-house attorney is not cost-justified at this stage in

82.6%

38

28.3%

13

60.9%

28

Outside attorneys are more responsive/timely

8.7%

4

Outside attorneys are more independent/objective

13.0%

6

Outside attorneys are better equipped to connect me to

4.3%

2

8.7%

4

our company’s development
We have an employee with legal training that plays the
role of in-house attorney when needed
Outside attorneys do a better job because they have
multiple attorneys who specialize in different areas of law

angel investors, venture capitalists, and others who can
help further my company’s development
Outside attorneys enhance our company’s reputation with
outside parties

Question #5: Rank the choices of your decision not to hire an in-house
attorney and instead use outside counsel, in order of importance. However,
ONLY rank the answers you selected in Question 4 above.
Answer Options

1

Most

2

3

4

5

6

7

Important

An in-house attorney not costjustified at this stage in our
company’s development

61%

8

Least

Important

15
%

4%

4%

0

2%

0

4%
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We have an employee with

2%

legal training that plays the
role

of

in-house

22

6.5

%

%

24

22%

0

0
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4%

4

6

%

attorney

when needed
Outside attorneys do a better
job

because

multiple

they

have

attorneys

who

28%

2%

0

0

2

%

0

%

specialize in different areas of
law
Outside attorneys are more

4%

9%

2%

responsive/timely

6.5

4%

Outside attorneys are more

4%

4%

4%

4%

0

4%

2%

0

independent/objective

6.5%

%
13
4%

equipped to connect me to
investors,

2

0

4

%

Outside attorneys are better
angel

4%

%

4%

%
11

4

%

%

9%

4

13%

venture

capitalists, and others who
can

help

further

my

company’s development
Outside attorneys enhance our
company’s

reputation

with

2%

2%

6.5

6.5

%

%

2%

11%

%

outside parties

Question #6: Do you plan to hire an in-house attorney at some point in
the company’s development?
Answer Options

Response Percent

Response Count

Yes

26.7%

12

No

26.7%

12

It depends on how large we grow

46.7%

21

General Questions
Question #1: Have you ever used a specialty “rent a general counsel”
type law firm comprised of former general counsel as opposed to traditional
law firm partners and associates?
Answer Options

Response

Response Count

Percent
Yes

12.9%

8

No

87.1%

54

Question #2: If you answered “Yes” to the question above, were you
satisfied?
Answer Options

Response
Percent

Response Count
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Yes

55.6%

5

No

11.1%

1

Somewhat

33.3%

3

Question #3: In what order would you hire the following for future legal
needs:
Answer Options

First-Most Likely to Hire

Second

Least Likely to Hire

Response
Count

Outside law firm

80%

15%

5%

61

In-house attorney

13%

46%

41%

61

Rent a general counsel firm

7%

31%

62%

58

Answered Question: 62

